Abstract: Digital video recorder proliferation and new commercial audience metrics are making television networks' revenues more sensitive to audience losses from advertising. There is currently little understanding of how traditional advertising and product placement affect television audiences. In this paper, we estimate a random coefficients logit model of viewing demand for television programs, wherein time given to traditional advertising and product placements is the "price" of consuming a program. Our sample includes audience, advertising, and program characteristics from more than 10,000 network-hours of prime-time broadcast television from 2004 to 2007. We find that the median effect of a 10% rise in traditional advertising time is a 15% reduction in audience size. We find evidence to suggest that creative strategy and product category factors are important determinants of viewer response to traditional advertising. We find evidence that suggests product placement causes viewer switching. In sum, our results imply that networks should give price discounts to those advertisers whose ads are most likely to retain viewers' interest throughout the commercial break.
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Television viewing is the dominant leisure activity in America. In a telephone survey Americans reported watching 2.6 hours of television per day, more than half of total leisure time.
1 Other measures suggest time spent viewing is much higher. Nielsen Media Research estimates the average adult watches 4.9 hours of television per day. Thus viewers are more able to avoid advertisements than ever before. And networks are more likely to be financially penalized for advertisement avoidance than ever before. Our purpose in this paper, then, is to understand the effects of advertising and product placements on television audiences.
This understanding is important in practice for several reasons. First, it can inform networks' sales strategy, influencing which advertisers they seek to sell commercial time to.
Second, it can influence networks' pricing. It may be optimal to raise ad prices for advertisers whose ads cause larger audience losses than average, or offer discounts to advertisers whose ads cause smaller audience losses. Third, viewer welfare is directly enhanced if networks can reduce viewer disutility from advertising. And if this reduction raises networks' advertising revenues, there may be an indirect effect on viewer welfare in the form of increased program investments.
Our key findings are that a 10% increase in advertising time causes a median audience loss of about 15%. Audience reaction to individual advertisements seems to be driven by advertising content. In the next section, we discuss salient features of the industry and the recent academic literature.
Industry background and relevant Literature
This paper is primarily related to two disparate strands of the literature: advertisement avoidance and television viewing demand.
Prior research documents strategies television viewers use to avoid commercials. Danaher (1995) investigated Nielsen Peoplemeter data in New Zealand and found that audience figures fell by a net 5% during ad breaks, due to a 10% audience loss to switching and a 5% audience gain from channel switchers leaving other channels. However, the context of the study was a three-channel environment in which simultaneous ad breaks were commonplace. Using Peoplemeter data from the Netherlands, Van Meurs (1998) found that channel switching decreased audience size during advertising breaks by a net 21.5%. Woltman Elpers, et al. (2003) used eye-tracking technology in the lab to find that subjects stopped watching 59.6% and 76.1% of all commercials. They found that commercial watching increases with entertainment content and decreases with information content. Tse and Chan (2001) called viewers at home immediately after commercial breaks ended and found that, of households watching television, 80.8% reported avoiding commercials or diverting their attention in some manner. These finding are buttressed by the large literature on advertising "wear-in" and "wear-out." For example, Siddarth and Chattopadhyay (1997) found the probability that a household switches channels during a particular ad is "J-shaped" with a minimum at 14 exposures.
One particularly interesting paper is Teixeira, Wedel, and Pieters (2008) . These authors used eye-tracking data to estimate a model of a viewer's decision to stop watching a commercial as a function of brand presence, prominence, duration, and location on the screen. They used the estimates to calculate optimal brand presence strategies, finding that pulsing the brand at the beginning and end of an ad minimized the probability of ad avoidance.
Advertising avoidance notwithstanding, until September 2007 advertising sales contracts were based on program ratings. Program ratings were defined by Nielsen Media Research as the fraction of potential viewers watching a given program for at least five minutes within any fifteen-minute block. Thus, the forms of advertising avoidance that most directly impacted network revenues were switching channels or turning off the television, as these are the two strategies that can decrease a program rating.
Quite separate from advertisement avoidance, there is a long literature on predicting viewer demand for television programs. Rust and Alpert (1984) were the first to use a discrete choice model to explain viewing behavior, demonstrating that contrary to previous findings, programs are important predictors of network audiences. More recently, Shachar and Emerson (2000) introduced cast demographic variables in viewing demand estimation and showed that viewers are more likely to watch programs that feature people who are demographically similar to themselves. Crawford (2000) used variation across cable systems in two snapshots of data to identify the welfare effects to consumers of the 1992 Cable Act, finding that mandatory price reductions were offset by changes in bundle characteristics and service erosion. Goettler and Shachar (2001) estimated a multidimensional ideal point model to calibrate a model of optimal program scheduling, finding that networks' adherence to scheduling "rules of thumb" (e.g. no situation comedies after 10 p.m.) was suboptimal. Anand and Shachar (2005) used data on viewers' exposure to television program "tune-ins" and subsequent viewing choices to identify tune-in effectiveness. They found that tune-ins are informative in nature: they make viewers more likely to watch programs that confer high subjective utility, and more likely to avoid programs that confer low subjective utility. Yang, Narayan, and Assael (2006) estimate a model in which husbands and wives have joint latent viewing preferences, finding that wives' viewing behavior depends more strongly on husbands' viewing status than vice versa.
A few studies have measured audience sensitivity to advertising levels found in various media, controlling for characteristics of media content. Kaiser and Wright (2006) estimated a two-sided equilibrium model of viewers and advertisers of women's magazines, finding that ads increased reader utility of magazines. Wilbur (2008b) found that a highly-rated broadcast network lost about 25% of its audience in response to a 10% increase in advertising time. Depken and Wilson (2004) estimated magazine-specific audience responses to advertising and found substantial heterogeneity across magazines, including many positive and many negative effects. The process by which advertising leads to increased or decreased viewership/readership has not been fully explored, but could be a function of consumer demographics, media content, media usage, advertising content, and advertising intrusiveness. Goeree (2008) found that advertising exposure and impact varies across demographic groups and advertising media, so it seems reasonable to expect that advertising avoidance varies across consumer demographics and media.
We also study audience responses to product placement. The first on-screen product placement occurred shortly after the invention of the movie, when in 1896 the Lumiere brothers filmed women washing clothes with Lever Brothers' Sunlight Soap placed in a prominent position. Lever Brothers provided Swiss film distribution in exchange for the favorable treatment. A commonly cited successful placement was the appearance of Reese's Pieces in the film E.T. the Extraterrestrial, to which Hershey's attributed a 65% rise in sales. Less commonly discussed is the placement of Coors Lite in the same film, to which no sales rise was attributed (Newell, Salmon and Chang 2006) . Balasubramanian, Karrh, and Parwardhan (2006) review the behavioral literature on product placement, attributing the many discrepancies among published findings to brand, consumer, and placement heterogeneity, and the difficulty of recreating product placement stimuli in laboratory settings. An interesting framework is proposed by Russell (2002) . She finds that placements have differential effects on consumers' memory and brand attitudes. Obtrusive placements are most likely to be remembered, but they positively influence consumers' attitude toward the brand only when they are congruent with the plot, and can harm brand attitudes when they are incongruent with the plot. These findings seemingly refute Ephron's (2003) conjecture about product placement: "If you notice, it's bad. But if you don't, it's worthless."
Finally, there is a large recent theoretical literature on two-sided media markets.
Prominent among these papers is Anderson and Coate (2005) , which shows that television markets can fail by providing too many ads when available programs are poor substitutes, or too few when advertisers' profits are large relative to viewers' disutility of ads. Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) model both the market for advertising sales and its subsequent effects on a product market. They show that media outlets can benefit by selling exclusive advertising, since this softens product-market competition and raises advertisers' willingness to pay. Our paper is relevant to this literature insofar as our results inform the assumptions it makes about how viewers respond to advertising of various types. The literature is reviewed by Anderson and Gabscewicz (2006) .
To our knowledge, our study is the first to estimate the effect of product placements on viewer switching. In addition, we examine the responsiveness of television audiences to traditional advertising in a dataset that is an order of magnitude larger than any studied previously. We do not know of any prior work that estimates how audience responsiveness to advertising varies with advertisement characteristics.
We conclude this section with a note about terminology. Traditionally, a rating is the fraction of all potential viewers who watched a given program. A share is the fraction of all viewers watching television who watched a given program. Our data measure program ratings, so we use this terminology throughout the paper to avoid confusion. Similarly, we use the term "product placement" to refer to the inclusion of brands or products within television programs, which is sometimes called "branded entertainment," "plugs," or "tie-ins." We refer to blocks of time sold to advertisers as "traditional advertising" or simply "advertising." We use the terms "program" and "show" interchangeably. An "ad creative" is a set of visual and audio stimuli encoded in a video file.
A Model of Television Viewing Behavior
In this section we describe our model of television viewing demand, and later estimate several variants of it. We follow previous literature by assuming that each television viewer watches one network at a time, and model program viewership in a discrete choice framework. Given the aggregate nature of our data, we use a random coefficients logit model similar to Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, hereafter "BLP") .
We index networks with n and programs with j. A viewer chooses from t N n ... 1 networks airing top-100 programs within half hour t. (Our audience datasource is a set of weekly "top 100" programs, described further in section 3.4.) Viewer utility is determined by time effects, program and network characteristics, and preference parameters. There exists a one-toone mapping from network-half hours (nt) to program-half hours (jt).
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The indirect utility viewer i derives from watching network n in half hour t is given by
where nt p is the number of seconds of product placements on network n during half-hour t, nt q is the number of seconds of traditional advertising on network n during half-hour t, i is a vector of utility parameters, and ) ; , ( i, n, and t. Choices are invariant to multiplication by a viewer-specific constant, so we fix the standard deviation of . 6 The rationale for including previous weeks' audience ratings is that many programs are serial in nature, so previous weeks' ratings are likely to predict demand for the current program. The nature of our data prevents us from using programs' lead-in and lead-out audiences, as is the standard practice in controlling for viewing persistence, because we do not observe variation in audience rating over half-hours within a date/program. 7 Including random coefficients ensures that predicted switching patterns will be based on program characteristics, rather than based solely on similarity in program audience ratings.
We can rewrite the model as 
and the viewers for whom network n at time t maximizes utility are described by demographics in the set
The audience rating for network n at time t is then given by
where ) ( F denotes the cumulative distribution function of i .
Data
To estimate the model we use data from two sources: TNS Media Intelligence (TNS) and the programs that aired during "prime time" evening hours each week, during which networks earn 61% of their advertising revenues.
Since programs typically change on half-hour increments, our unit of observation is the date-network-half-hour, e.g. January 1, 2007, ABC, 8:00-8:30 P.M. We discuss each component of the data in more detail, and present descriptive statistics in section 3.5.
Program Data
Program characteristics data come from TNS and consist of program name, genre, network, and date of each airing. As we discuss in section 3.2, we observe each advertisement within each program, so we are able to construct approximate start and end times for each program-date. There were a few programs that appeared on more than one network over the course of While our unit of observation is a date-network-half-hour, a network occasionally aired more than one program per half-hour slot. This affected less than 1% of the half-hours in our sample and was usually related to sports programming. For example, a game ran longer than its scheduled timeslot, or a half-hour included both a "pre-game show" and part of a game (two separate programs for which we observe separate audience ratings). We therefore had to choose which program's audience rating to assign to some date-network-half-hours shared by two programs. We followed a two-step procedure. If exactly one of the two programs did not appear in any other half-hours, then we assigned that program's audience rating to the half-hour. If both programs spanned multiple half-hours, then we assumed the program that contained more advertising during the date-network-half-hour in question accurately reflected the true audience rating. It was never the case that neither program spanned multiple half-hours.
Traditional Advertising Data
Advertising data are drawn from TNS Media Intelligence's "Stradegy" database. This database provides advertisers, advertising agencies, and other marketers with "competitive advertising intelligence." It is widely subscribed within industry.
For all advertisements that aired during the sample period, we observe the brand advertised (e.g. Coca-Cola Classic), the network, start time, and length of the ad, and a name identifying the specific ad creative. In addition, TNS manually classified each brand as belonging to a category (e.g. Regular Carbonated Soft Drinks), an industry (Beverages), a subsidiary (Coca-Cola USA) and a parent company (Coca-Cola Co.).
Networks aired about 250,000 advertisements during our sample period. These included about 29,000 different ad creatives for 5,000 different brands spanning 350 categories in 50
industries. We construct daily network-half-hour measures of the frequency of the most common ad creatives and most commonly advertised product categories, and measure their effects on viewer utility. We report the results in section 5.2.
We have data on the average price of a thirty second commercial for each program on each date. Networks report these date-program average advertising costs to TNS and Nielsen after their programs air, who then report the data to media buyers. These data allow media buyers to estimate costs of future media plans. If networks over-report these costs, they have a greater ability to give advertisers perceived discounts when negotiating ad prices. If they under-report these costs, they may limit their programs' potential advertising demand. We are not aware of any evidence of systematic under-or over-reporting, perhaps because of the repeated nature of transactions in this industry. (These are not "rate card" data.)
We do not observe advertisements networks aired for their upcoming programs ("tuneins" or "promos"), as TNS' ad-recording software was not able to distinguish tune-ins from network programs. Time given to tune-ins is a potentially important omitted variable; we describe our endogeneity controls in section 4. For each product placement, we observe the brand placed, the brand characteristics defined in section 3.2, and the product placement characteristics listed in Table 2 . In the median placement, an identifiable product or package is shown in the foreground with no other brands or products on the screen. Products are integrated into the program in just 16% of all placements.
As with advertising, we aggregate over placements to construct measures of product placement at the date-network-half-hour level. Networks typically do not reveal placement terms, so no available datasource reports product placement prices. Our understanding of the industry is that product placements are sometimes paid in cash, sometimes bartered, and sometimes are not paid. Payment is more likely when plot integration or character interaction occurs, in which case the integration or interaction almost always depicts the brand or product favorably.
In the product placement data, we observe episode names for regular programs.
Therefore, for the second and third television seasons in our data, we were able to construct an indicator of whether each episode had appeared previously in the television season. 9 We call this variable NewEps. It stands to reason that new program episodes are more attractive to viewers than previously-aired episodes ("re-runs"), so we use this information in predicting viewing demand.
Television Audience Data
Only a handful of television viewing datasets have been available to academic researchers in the past 20 years. Most of those datasets contain individual viewers' program choices over a limited number of days and programs. Our dataset contrasts with others in that we have an unusually large number of time periods and programs, but we do not have cross-sectional variation over individuals or markets.
We collected our audience data from weekly "top 100" program lists found on the TVB Table 4 shows the raw correlations between the major variables. Notably, the correlation between advertising and product placement is close to zero. This may suggest product placements' fit with program narrative is the primary determinant of how many product placements to include in a program, rather than revenue maximization. It is also notable that product placement time is positively correlated with audiences, with correlations ranging from 0.13 to 0.17.
Slice-of-Life and Situation Comedy genres contain more advertising and product placement time than Drama/Adventure and Police/Suspense/Mystery programs. While audiences across demographic groups are highly correlated, genre preferences depend on demographics.
Household-level audiences are more likely to watch police programs than adults 18-49 (0.18 correlation to 0.07), while adults 18-49 are more likely to watch reality programs than the households audience (0.14 to 0.05). 
Estimation

Endogeneity
The error term in the model is nt , which represents program characteristics that may be known to the networks and viewers but are unobserved by the econometrician. We specify
where j is the mean of unobserved characteristics for program j, and j denotes the program that aired on network n at time t. (Remember that we have a one-to-one mapping from nt into jt, so we could equivalently write jt in place of nt .) We use the serial nature of the data to estimate j with program-specific fixed effects. The nt term represents deviations from this mean over time periods in which the program airs. We include NewEps, network-weekday and season-week dummies in nt X to try to remove variation in nt due to episode quality, networks' historical schedule strength, and temporally variable factors like weather.
After including program and network-time effects, the source of error in the model is nt , which represents deviations from mean unobserved program utility. This structural error term could capture unobserved temporal variation in program quality as some episodes of a program may be more entertaining than others. It could also capture variation in time given to tune-ins. We include lags of ad price per viewer in the viewer utility function as ad price per viewer is likely to be correlated with tune-in seconds.
10 It could also capture measurement error in the audience data.
Television networks may know their programs' and episodes' quality, including those aspects captured in nt , and may take it into account when setting traditional advertising and product placement levels. As a result we have a potential endogeneity problem in that advertising choices may be functions of nt . (However it should be noted that if networks had complete information about programs' and episodes' quality, we likely would see a lower rate of new program failure in the data.)
We use three sets of instruments to address remaining endogeneity issues: (1) 
Identification
We discuss informally what variation in the data identifies the parameters. Associated with each network-half hour is a mean utility, nt , which is chosen to match observed and predicted audience ratings. Audience levels identify the show, network-day, week, and half-hour effects.
Holding these characteristics constant, correlations between audience, advertising, and product placement over time identify the mean utility parameters associated with advertising and product placement.
In practice we cannot estimate a separate dummy for every show in the sample, because some shows did not appear frequently enough to identify their own dummy. Thus we assign a show dummy to as many shows as possible, and the remaining shows are described by networkday, time, and genre effects. Some genre effects are dropped because they are highly collinear with the set of show dummies for the shows belonging to that genre. We are able to separately identify show effects from network-time effects because of the rich scheduling variation over the three-year sample period.
Identification of the taste distribution parameters relies on patterns of viewer substitution between shows. While the means of show utility are identified by audience sizes, the standard deviations are identified by the "stickiness" of how those audience sizes change when faced with variation in show competition, advertising, and product placements on competing networks within the same half-hour.
Estimation
The econometric technique follows recent studies of differentiated products, such as BLP (1995) and Nevo (2000) . We estimate the model using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
The moments match the predicted demographic audience ratings for network-half hours nt to the corresponding observed ratings.
To estimate the restricted model we follow Berry (1994 
We search over parameter values to minimize the GMM objective function
where } { nt is the Nx1 error term, and is a weighting matrix. As an initial guess we set
, which we use in the final parameter estimation.
The BLP estimation routine has the desirable property that it is linear in preference means, which greatly speeds computation by reducing the number of parameters that enter the objective function nonlinearly. However it is still nonlinear in the standard deviations of the preference distributions, and computation time increases exponentially with the number of nonlinear parameters to be estimated. We restrict the number of parameters interacting with For the random coefficients logit results in section 5.3, we sampled 1000 candidate ˆ' s in a grid search to find starting values, and to ensure we could not find a better solution than (12), as the GMM objective function is not globally concave. We found many local minima, but when drawn over the range of grid points we sampled, the objective function looks convex to the eye in both dimensions of . Computation time was about five days on a 3.2 GHz computer using serial processing.
Results
In section 5.1 we estimate several versions of the multinomial logit (MNL) model using the method described in section 4.3. The ease of MNL estimation makes it helpful for specification testing. We first explore how the proposed endogeneity controls affect the results and explore 
5.1.
Multinomial Logit Results
In section 4.2 we proposed to use show dummies to control for unobserved program characteristics. Without show dummies, we would expect advertising responsiveness to be biased upward, since networks would include higher ad levels in programs with higher unobserved quality. As table 5 shows, without show dummies we find both advertising and product placements have significant, positive effects on utility. When we add show dummies, the point estimates fall markedly, and advertising time is again significant, but this time with the opposite sign.
Our other endogeneity control is instrumental variables for intertemporal variation in unobserved program characteristics and unobserved tune-in levels. We present the results of instrumental variables robustness checks in Appendix 1. To summarize, we found that lags of advertising and product placements are valid instruments for advertising and product placement time, but their use does not materially affect the estimates. We proceed with OLS estimation on efficiency grounds. Please see Appendix 1 for complete details. Next we consider what function we should use for advertising and product placement utility. We know of no extant theory available to guide our selection. It seems reasonable to expect that marginal utility of advertising and product placement may be nonlinear. Wilbur (2008b) reports finding no evidence of nonlinearity in advertising utility, but our dataset is an order of magnitude larger. We followed two common procedures to select a functional form; both led to the same conclusion. First, we used splines with varying numbers of knots to estimate the shape of the advertising and product placement marginal utility functions. Second, we added powers of each term to a linear specification and stopped when the next power added was not statistically significant. Both methods indicated that ) ; , ( nt nt q p v should be cubic in traditional advertising time, and quadratic in product placement time. We found no evidence of interactions between advertising and product placement. Figure 2 shows the estimated marginal utility of advertising for each of the three demographic groups. We found that the households demographic group is less averse to advertising than the other two groups, but there is no apparent difference between adults 18-49 and adults 25-54. Ad utility is everywhere decreasing, with an inflection point at 407 seconds.
Results without show dummies
Results with show dummies
Just 16% of observed ad levels exceed this inflection point. households appear to respond the most positively to product placement, followed by adults 25-54 and adults 18-49.
While we have included several endogeneity controls, we wondered if the product placement results still may be biased. It could be the case that product placements are naturally accommodated by certain types of program scenes that contain unobserved characteristics that are attractive to viewers. For example, if high-budget program scenes are attractive to viewers, and contain increased levels of product placement, our finding of positive product placement utility could be spurious. Such content could vary over episodes in a program and therefore escape the control provided by our program dummies. This problem seems unlikely to affect our traditional advertising utility estimates since advertising content is not typically influenced by program content.
We collected some additional data to investigate this possibility. We describe the procedure in detail in Appendix 2. The website TV.com aggregates viewers' opinions about television program quality. We supplemented these data with information from our sample, so we were able to separately control for episode quality and product placement. When we did this, we found that the estimated effect of product placement time on utility was negative and significant. We include in nt X the product placement characteristics described in section 3.1.
nt X includes
t ln x , which represents the fraction of product placement seconds on network n during half-hour t that have characteristic l. In this way we are able to separately control for the amount of placements during the program and the types of placements observed. The estimates, reported in Table 6 , do not indicate that product placement characteristics drive program viewing decisions.
Some Substantive Results
In this section we report results from some multinomial logit regressions that exploit the richness of the data. The questions we consider are: how do the effects of advertising on audience sizes vary by product category? How do they vary by program genre? How do they vary by ad creative?
In addition to the above questions, we investigated whether advertising utility varied over the course of the sample, but we did not find any evidence to show that it did. We similarly did not find evidence that advertising utility varies with advertisement length.
Ad Utility by Product Category
To estimate the effect of product category advertising on utility we set 
where cnt p is the product placement time given to brands in category c on network n in half-hour t, and cjt q is the corresponding ad level. Table 7 shows the significant estimates of p c and q c . Our priors were that beer and movie ads would be positively associated with utility, and possibly car ads. The results are consistent with these expectations, as the most liked category ads include movies, DVDs, light beer, regular beer, diet soft drinks, and four automotive categories. More surprising was the appearance of finance-related categories, including banks, insurance, and financial services. We reviewed some of these ads to try to understand the results further. Our general sense is that these ads contain higher entertainment value and production budgets than the typical ad, perhaps because they must capture consumer attention for products that might not otherwise be enjoyable to think about. The most-liked categories were corporate computing and participatory sports, though both represent a very small share of total advertising dollars. Corporate computing was dominated by a highly entertaining branding campaign by IBM, while the highest-spending brand in participatory sports was 1-800-SKYDIVE.
The estimates indicate that viewers are averse to advertising in a variety of categories. 
where ynt 1 indicates that network n aired a program of genre y during half-hour t. None of the genre effects were significant, with the exceptions of comedy's effect on advertising utility and police/suspense/mystery's effect on advertising and product placement utility, for which all of the 's were significant at the 95% level. Figure 4 displays the estimated ad utilities during comedy and police/suspense/mystery genre next to the general ad utility estimated in section 5.1.
It appears that viewers respond more positively to ads in comedy programs, and very strongly negatively to ads in police/suspense/mystery programs. Figure 5 shows that estimated product placement sensitivity begins to fall and turn negative at high levels of product placement during police/suspense/mystery programs. 
where hnt q is the number of ad seconds devoted to creative h on network n at time t, h is the effect of creative h on utility, and nt q 0 is the amount of all ad time given to creatives that are not in the set 1…H. We choose ad creatives to include in H by following two steps. First, TNS creative names sometimes include an integer at the end, to indicate that the creative is a minor departure from a previously-logged commercial for the same brand. Typically these departures are :15-second versions of a :30-second ad, or a change in on-screen text in an otherwise identical ad. We drop this integer to pool across variations within an ad creative, yielding about 24,000 ad creatives in the sample. Second, we define a dummy variable for each of the 350 ad creatives that occurred on television most frequently during our restricted sample period. Thus H=350. Each ad described by a creative-specific utility parameter appeared at least 42 times.
Of the 350 ad creative parameters, 35 were estimated to be significant at the 95% confidence level. Table 9 displays the creative names, brands, parameter estimates, and tstatistics for each of those creatives. It also shows what fraction of all ads and ad dollars in the sample each creative accounted for.
We interpret these results with some caution. We presume that most of the ad creatives in the sample have some effect on viewer utility, and we would be better able to detect those effects if we had individual-level viewing data. We are looking here at the tails of the distribution of ad creative utility.
With those caveats in mind, it is interesting to note what these ads do not have in common. It does not appear that brand identity is a primary driver of ad creative utility, as two brands (Verizon Wireless and Old Navy) have ad creatives with significant positive effects, and ad creatives with significant negative effects. However, none of the estimated creative effects contradict the positive and negative category-specific effects presented earlier.
We watched the ads in Table 9 to try to get a general sense of what creative elements drive the results. We noticed that ads with positive effect estimates tended to be upbeat and positive, and to feature actors that appeared younger than about 40 years old. One advertisement featured a popular celebrity (Denzel Washington) and another had a song from a popular band (Kings of Leon).
Ad creatives with negative effect estimates were more likely to feature actors appearing older than forty, convey negative messages, and depict scenes of frustration. Some contained what could be subjectively termed annoying stimuli, such as intentionally bad dancing ("Push It/I365 Nextel Phone"), high-pitched, rapid speech ("1500 Whenever Mins/Cheerleader on Phone") or actors using made-up words in conversation ("Men and Ellen at Reception are Gellin"). The results suggest that, consistent with Woltman Elpers et al. (2003) , creative strategy drives viewer acceptance of advertising. While we find these effects to be interesting, they are suggestive at best. We hope that future research will undertake a systematic content analysis of a large sample of advertisements, and correlate ad creative characteristics (like what appeals are used) with viewer propensity to switch during the ad (as in Teixeira, Wedel and Pieters 2008) .
Random coefficients logit results
In this section we present results from the full random coefficients logit model, including elasticities of advertising. Our advertising utility specification is given in equation (16). 
We tried including random coefficients for all five elements of i , but this greatly increased the objective function value and the function no longer appeared to be roughly convex. Given the high correlations among powers of nt p and nt q , it may be impractical to expect the data to separately identify more than one element of i for each variable.
The main results of the estimation are shown in Table 10 . The model fit the data well, with a Pseudo R 2 of 0.7499. The mean effects of advertising and product placement have the same signs as those estimated in the multinomial logit model, but are not estimated precisely.
Most of the significant effects are those associated with the program dummies, networkday dummies, and half-hour dummies. Table 11 shows the highest estimated program effects.
The top programs were American Idol, Desperate Housewives, Grey's Anatomy, and Lost. given a change in ad time mt q . Therefore substitution patterns are not driven by aggregate market shares irrespective of program characteristics, as in the multinomial logit model, but instead they are calculated as the aggregation of simulated discrete choices given the estimated distribution of preference heterogeneity. Also notable is that the model produces a different elasticity for each network-half hour. We focus below on advertising elasticities, as the results in Appendix 2 suggest that our product placement utility estimates may be biased. Table 13 displays the median estimated audience elasticities of advertising. In general, if a broadcast network increases its advertising time by 10%, its program audience will fall by about 15%. The cross-elasticities are roughly comparable in nature across the "inside" networks and the outside option, but since the market share of the outside option is much larger than the sum of the shares of the inside networks, this indicates that when viewers leave an audience in response to an additional advertisement, they usually turn away from broadcast television altogether (tuning to a cable network, for example) rather than switching to another top-100 program. It is interesting to compare our elasticities estimates to those of Wilbur (2008b) . He estimated a similar model using audimeter/diary audience data from multiple local markets. He found median own-elasticities of about -2.5 for the highly-rated networks in his sample, and larger elasticities for low-rated networks. Our elasticities are smaller and more homogeneous by comparison. The difference in our estimates may perhaps be attributed to the unreliability of diary data, which places a much higher burden on the audience member than the Peoplemeter technology used to produce the audience data in this paper.
Discussion
In light of the increasing importance of advertisement avoidance, we estimated a model of television viewing demand in which viewing decisions depend on program characteristics, scheduling factors, advertising time and characteristics, and product placement time and characteristics. Our key findings are that a 10% increase in advertising reduces a network's audience by a median 15%, and audience responses to advertising seem to be driven by product category and advertising content.
Our findings imply that networks ought to price discriminate among advertisers in order to maximize audience retention throughout their commercial breaks. There are three ways this could be done in practice. The simplest way would be to give ad price breaks to advertisers in categories which have traditionally been associated with high-utility ad creatives, such as beer and movies. Accordingly, higher prices could be charged to those advertisers in categories that historically cause higher audience losses.
A more nuanced way to implement this would be to set up a system whereby advertisers have to submit their creatives to standardized tests of audience acceptance. For example, an ad creative could be vetted by an online consumer panel or inserted into network programming online (e.g., on Hulu.com). This testing could measure viewer response to the ad. Given enough consumers in the panel and a standard approach toward testing creatives, a formula could be devised to adjust the advertiser's price. The attraction of this idea is that it would give advertisers an increased incentive to produce engaging advertising, and could possibly correct the currently unpriced externality in which one ad causes an audience loss that then harms later advertisers in the commercial break.
The third approach would be to base ad prices on more granular television audience measurements, such as second-by-second ratings currently extractable from the universe of digital cable boxes and digital video recorders (Wilbur 2008a ). This would give advertisers the strongest incentives to avoid causing audience losses, but is the most difficult to implement, since ownership of the data reside with multiple parties with potentially conflicting interests, and the television industry has historically been slow to agree upon and implement common metrics.
We view all three of these suggestions as realistic. The first can feasibly be implemented right away, while the second probably needs to be refined after a design and testing phase. The third suggestion is the most difficult to set up, but would have the most positive impact on the television industry's collective health in the long run. It would also likely have the greatest effect on viewer welfare, which is consequential in an industry with such a large share of gross domestic leisure time.
Like all models, ours has several limitations which suggest directions for future research.
Primary among these is our seeming inability to estimate unbiased product placement effects on utility in the full sample. Another limitation is that we have not modeled consumer uncertainty about advertising and product placement time, as was done by Shachar (2004, 2005) .
This is difficult to do reliably using aggregate share data, but could possibly be done by applying the approaches of Chen and Yang (2007) or Musalem, Bradlow and Raju (forthcoming) . Finally, while we have used the best audience data available to us, there is obviously scope for estimating a similar model using more granular data, such as commercial minute ratings or second-bysecond set-top box data.
Appendix 1. Instrument Validation.
We follow Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997) to validate the use of lags of ad seconds and product placement seconds as instruments for current ad seconds and product placement time. There are three steps to this procedure. The first step is to use F-tests to determine whether the proposed instruments jointly explain the endogenous variables. The second step is to use F-tests to determine whether the proposed instruments can be justifiably excluded from the viewer utility function. Third, we use a Hausman specification test to gauge the difference between the OLS and IV estimates. The first two steps of this procedure formalize the standard instrumental-variables intuition that valid instruments should be (1) Hausman test fails to reject the null that the OLS estimates are preferred to the IV estimates.
Thus the use of these instruments does not change the estimated effects of the potentially endogenous variables enough to justify the loss of efficiency associated with IV estimation.
We can think of three possible reasons why the data may reject the IV estimates. First, it could be that networks are unable to predict how their programs' utility varies over time. This would be consistent with the high rate of new show failure observed in the industry. Second, it may be that networks know how their shows' utility varies over time, but do not use this knowledge in setting advertising and product placements. This might be consistent with a mixed strategy equilibrium. Third, it is possible that endogeneity affects our estimates, but we cannot correct for it without a stronger set of instruments. We explore this final possibility further in Appendix 2. We conclude that OLS estimation is appropriate in any of these three scenarios. 
Appendix 2. Estimating Product Placement Utility with Episode Quality Controls
We are concerned that, despite our controls for endogeneity, the product placement utility estimates may be positively biased. It could be that occasions for product placement in a program episode correlate with unobserved episode characteristics that increase viewer utility. The program effects control for variation in unobserved program characteristics across programs in the sample, but not across episodes within a program. It is this latter variation that may be correlated with product placement, thereby creating the bias. If we had an independent measure of program quality that varied over episodes within a program, we could control for unobserved episode quality and measure the effect of product placement independently of episode quality.
We were able to find such a measure in an online database, TV.com. This site states that "TV.com is home to millions of television fans contributing and connecting via their favorite shows. From program ratings and episode reviews to forum posts and blogs, the fans provide almost all of the site's content…" The site is a wiki in which viewers can list, review, and assign quality "scores" to television programs and episodes. Each program and episode in the database has been scored on a 1-10 scale by TV.com users. Popular programs' episodes are often rated by 400 or more users. The website says 72.3% of its users are between the ages of 18 and 49, 55%
are female, and they watch an average of 21 television hours per week. Thus we think their ratings may be a reasonable proxy for episode utility experienced by adults 18-49. The benefit of using this dataset is that it contains average episode quality scores, which will allow us to control for the endogeneity issue discussed in the previous paragraph.
The TV.com data are rich but incomplete and often inaccurate. The website's program database is missing many of the programs in our sample and the quality score data is very sparse for lesser-known programs. The episode database seems to have even more problems. Even popular programs have duplicate episode listings and are missing some new episodes. Some episodes' air dates are listed incorrectly. We also considered using data from tv.yahoo.com (another wiki), but this database seemed to have even more omissions and duplicates than TV.com. We therefore concluded it would be infeasible to add the episode-level TV.com data into the TNS/TVB sample.
Instead, we decided to download some of the good TV.com data and supplement it with TNS/TVB data. The data seem to contain fewer flaws for popular programs, so we identified the most-frequently-programmed show in each of the four most common genres in the TNS/TVB We estimated a multinomial logit model at the program-episode level in which the dependent variable was the log-transformation of observed program/episode ratings and outside share data. The independent variables were the average number of advertising seconds per halfhour, average number of product placement seconds per half-hour, the average previous week's audience in the same network-half hours to control for state dependence, a scalar indicating how many new episodes of the program had previously been aired in the same season to control for narrative arc, program dummies, a dummy for the 2005-06 season, and weekday dummies. We also tried including calendar-month dummies, product placement characteristics, powers of advertising and product placement time, and interactions between program dummies and product placement time, but none of these increased the adjusted R 2 enough to justify the degrees of freedom they cost. Table A2 shows our results. The primary result of interest is the effect of product placement on utility, which is estimated to be negative and significant at the 95% confidence level. This finding is robust to basic specification changes. It suggests that our product placement estimates reported in section 5 are positively biased.
The effects of advertising and episode quality score on utility are not estimated to be significant. Ad price per viewer, included to control for unobserved tune-in levels, is negative and significant. The weekday effects, season dummy, and program effects are all significant, yielding a high degree of fit. State dependence is not estimated to be significant, perhaps due to its correlation with the program and weekday dummies.
In sum, we conclude that our product placement results in the full model are likely biased upwards. However, we are not able to control for this bias in the full sample. 
